Geopolitical Trends and Security Challenges across the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific Regions; Strategic Insights, v. 10, Special issue (October 2011), 28-35. Topic: Global Trends and Future Warfare ; Part I: Alternative Perspectives: Traditional Powers, Rising Powers, and the Developing World by Parthasarathy, G.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2011-10-01
Geopolitical Trends and Security
Challenges across the Indian Ocean
and Asia-Pacific Regions; Strategic
Insights, v. 10, Special issue (October
2011), 28-35. Topic: Global Trends and
Future Warfare ; Part I: Alternative
Perspectives: Traditional Powers, Rising
Powers, and the Developing World
G. Parthasarathy
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Strategic Insights, V. 10, Special issue (October 2011), 28-35. Topic: Global Trends and Future




5. Geopolitical Trends and Security Challenges across the Indian 
Ocean and Asia-Pacific Regions 
G. Parthasarathy 
 
India’s foreign policy in the contemporary world will be guided by a number of diverse 
considerations. Now described as an “emerging power,” the predominant focus of attention in India 
will remain on fashioning an environment, both external and internal, which will help the country to 
proceed on a path of around double digit economic growth, with economic growth being as 
inclusive as possible. In a diverse and pluralistic country like India, the very process of economic 
growth will inevitably generate social, ethnic, linguistic and sectarian tensions. While corruption and 
criminalization of politics are presently straining its body politic, adversely affecting economic 
growth and evoking public criticism, there is, nevertheless, confidence that India has the strength 
and resilience to overcome these challenges. Terrorism sponsored by radical, Wahhabi oriented 
Islamist groups, is going to remain a formidable diplomatic and security challenge. The American 
“War on Terror” has dispersed, but not destroyed the terrorist threat emerging from India’s western 
neighbourhood. Moreover, with its demand for energy resources rising rapidly, India will have to 
focus increasing attention on the Persian Gulf, where over two thirds of the world’s resources of oil 
and gas are located and regional rivalries and sectarian tensions have been exacerbated following the 
American invasion of Iraq. 
The National Intelligence Council Report Global Trends 2020 observed that Asia, with a relatively 
young population and work force, expanding educational facilities and the benefits of globalization, 
and 60% of the world’s population, will become the manufacturing hub of the world in coming 
years. China and India will alone provide 1.1 billion of the labour force of 1.7 billion in the Asia-
Pacific Region. In the next half century, as the developed world and especially Europe ages, a 
younger and better educated work force in Asia will become the driving force for global 
manufacturing and growth. The balance of power will shift—particularly from Europe to Asia. 
Given this scenario, India is developing a comprehensive policy of promoting widespread 
engagement not only with the fast growing Asia-Pacific Region to its East, but also with the oil rich 
Persian Gulf Region to its west, from where it imports 70% of its oil and where an estimated 5.8 
million Indian nationals now live and work, accounting for the bulk of the $50 billion total that 
Indians overseas remit to India every year.  
India has made sustained efforts for economic integration, not only in South Asia and within 
SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), but also with the rapidly growing 
economies of East and Southeast Asia. Over the past two decades, India’s “Look East” policies have 
enhanced its diplomatic profile in its eastern neighbourhood. As a full “Dialogue Partner of 
ASEAN” (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and as a member of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF), India has concluded a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the ASEAN grouping, after 
concluding bilateral FTAS with two ASEAN members, Thailand and Singapore. It is now a 
participant in the annual East Asia Summit, which currently includes the leaders of China, Japan, 
South Korea, Australia and New Zealand (with the US and Russia scheduled to join), apart from the 
Heads of ASEAN Governments. India’s trade and investment ties with the countries of East and 
Southeast Asia are rapidly expanding. Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreements with 
Japan and South Korea have been inked. Within South Asia, the South Asian Free Trade Agreement 
(SAFTA), though limited to trade in goods, is regarded as the first step towards establishing free 
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trade in investments and services, with the goal of progressively moving towards establishing a 
customs union and an economic union in South Asia. Supplementing efforts at economic 
integration within SAARC are moves for economic cooperation in the Bay of Bengal. The Bay of 
Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), an economic 
grouping comprising Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Thailand, acts as a 
bridge between South and Southeast Asia.  
In this emerging scenario, where a common quest for prosperity and rapid economic growth is 
driving a process of increased Asian economic integration, how will the US and China, which are set 
to be the two major competing centres of global power, view other players in coming years? A US 
journalist described the US-China relationship as one “between a still dominant, but fading 
superpower, facing a new and ambitious rival, with suspicion on both sides.” China’s economy 
continues to boom, recording a growth of 10.3% in 2010. China has spent over $ 100 billion in aid 
to developing countries during the past few years—exceeding the aid given by the World Bank. 
Chinese aid is ostensibly without strings, but is focused on acquiring access to natural resources in 
recipient countries. The United States, on the other hand, is presently mired in an economic crisis 
with high unemployment and with a budget deficit estimated at 10.64% of GDP.  
While there has been a marked improvement in the climate of Sino-Indian relations in recent years, 
the relationship between India and China is still clouded by mistrust. While China views improved 
US-Indian relations with suspicion, India retains memories of close Sino-US cooperation detrimental 
to its interests, during the Nixon and Clinton Administrations. There is concern in India about what 
is perceived as China’s policy of “containment” of India, marked by growing Chinese interest in 
maritime facilities in countries like Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Pakistan. China’s supply of 
weapons to the beleaguered regime of King Gyanendra of Nepal at a time when the international 
community was nurturing a process of democratic change in the country, as well as its continuing 
cooperation with Pakistan in nuclear and missile development, have only accentuated Indian 
misgivings. China’s growing “assertiveness” in its territorial claims on the Indian border State of 
Arunachal Pradesh, its efforts to undermine India’s efforts for regional influence by opposing 
India’s participation in forums like the East Asia Summit and the summit-level Asia Europe 
Meetings (ASEM), its ambivalence on India’s candidature for permanent membership of the UN 
Security Council and its attempts within the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to maintain global 
nuclear sanctions on India, indicate that dealing with China is going to be a major challenge for India 
in coming years. 
Despite these differences and challenges, bilateral trade and economic relations between Beijing and 
New Delhi are booming and the two countries have embarked on a series of measures to enhance 
mutual confidence. Moreover, on multilateral issues, such as global warming and the Doha Round 
of the WTO, common and shared interests and perceptions have led the two governments to 
cooperate with each other. The Indian response to Chinese policies of “containment” and “strategic 
encirclement” has been largely defensive. But, as India’s economic and military potential grow and 
the country’s “soft power” expands, India is dealing with Chinese policies by adopting more pro-
active measures in its relations with countries like Japan, South Korea and Vietnam; by developing a 
larger footprint in its relations with ASEAN; and a more imaginative economic engagement with 
Taiwan. At the same time, there are significant constituencies for peace and cooperation in both 
India and China. There are efforts collectively by India, Russia and China to cooperate in the 
evolution of a stable, multipolar world order, in forums like BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, 
South Africa) and the G20. Conscious efforts are being made to keep tensions from escalating—
particularly along the Sino-Indian border—and to widen engagement between India and China 
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bilaterally, regionally and globally. Common sense dictates that there is enough strategic space across 
Asia for India and China to cooperate and develop to their full potential. 
In 1991, Deng Xiaoping advocated to his countrymen a strategy of “hide your strength, bide your 
time,” to enable China to develop rapidly, without being held back by global and regional tensions 
and rivalries. As its economic power and military strength have grown, China is widely perceived in 
recent years as flexing its military muscle, evoking concerns in its hitherto sanguine neighbours. 
China has, over the past few years, been more assertive in relations with countries across its Asia-
Pacific neighbourhood, ranging from Japan and Vietnam to Indonesia and India, particularly on 
issues pertaining to maritime and land borders. Another issue arises from reports of China’s plans to 
dam the Brahmaputra River, provoking substantial concern in India and Bangladesh. There are 
concerns that what are presently run of the river projects, could well be the first step towards future 
diversion of river waters. China is not a signatory to the 1997 UN Convention on Transnational 
Rivers and the experiences of downstream countries along the Mekong Basin evoke concerns in 
India and Bangladesh. India has formal inter-State agreements on sharing river waters with 
Bangladesh and Pakistan, which have worked well, despite new problems arising from the melting of 
Himalayan glaciers because of climate change.  
China recently declared that like Tibet and Taiwan, the entire South China Sea is an area of “core 
interest.” Territorial claims in the South China Sea have been enforced using maritime power. The 
visiting Commander of the American Pacific Fleet Admiral Timothy Keating was told by his 
Chinese counterparts in May 2009 that the United States should recognize the western Pacific and 
the Indian Ocean as China’s sphere of influence. China opposed Joint US-South Korean military 
exercises in the Yellow Sea, after North Korea torpedoed and sank a South Korean naval vessel. 
China has also been increasingly assertive with Japan in disputes in the East China Sea over the 
Senkaku Island and on differences over drilling rights in contested areas. The export of crucial rare 
earth materials to Japan was suspended in the wake of tensions over maritime boundaries. 
Consultations have now been held between India and Japan on measures to end dependence on 
China in such strategic areas. The crucial concern is whether China will become militarily more 
assertive and nationalistic as its economic and military power grows, or whether it will abide by the 
policies advocated by Deng Xiaoping.  
There are concerns cross Asia that as Chinese economic and military power grow, the United States 
will become more circumspect and accommodating in dealing with China. The Chinese will, in turn, 
appear to respond positively to American concerns on issues like nuclear proliferation in Iran and 
North Korea. The Russians seem to be prepared to take advantage of this situation by extending 
selective support to the US on issues like their logistical needs in Afghanistan. Japan has already 
adopted a more China-specific defence posture. Japan’s New Defence Guidelines Programme of 
2010 explicitly states that China’s “military modernization and its insufficiency of transparency” are a 
“major concern.” Naval exercises involving India, Japan and the US were held near Okinawa last 
year and India is expanding security cooperation with Asia-Pacific countries like Japan, South Korea 
and Vietnam. India’s partnership with Russia remains strong and multi-faceted.  
While the US-Russian relationship has strengthened recently, a stable balance of power across Asia 
cannot emerge until there is a clear understanding and accommodation between the US and Russia 
on the vital issues of NATO expansion and an on what legitimate Russian interests are in the former 
Soviet Republics. Even if there are rivalries over access to energy resources, both the US and Russia 
share a common interest in resisting religious extremism in Central Asia and across the Caucasus 
region. It is crucial that differences between the US and Russia do not affect the invaluable role that 
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US-Russian cooperation can play in dealing with problems of extremism and terrorism emanating 
from Afghanistan and its neighbourhood. As the Global Trends 2025 report observes, Pakistan 
faces strains to its polity, arising from the conflict in Afghanistan. The northern supply route 
through Russia and Central Asia is crucial for a joint US-Russian effort to stabilize Afghanistan and 
its neighbourhood.  
China will continue its military, nuclear, economic, and diplomatic cooperation with Pakistan and 
enhance its economic and military profile across the strategic sea lanes of the Indian Ocean. This 
will have to be dealt with by imaginative economic, diplomatic and military responses and a process 
of intense engagement with China. Efforts to build structures for cooperation in the Indian Ocean 
region can be initiated by building an inclusive and effective architecture for cooperation to deal 
with problems like piracy and natural disasters. It would be incorrect to exaggerate the possibilities 
of conflict between India and China. India will, however, complement its economic growth with 
modernization of its armed forces, improvement of communications along its borders with China 
and development of its nuclear and missile capabilities. India’s interaction with ASEAN members 
and especially with Vietnam, Singapore, and Indonesia is regarded as essential in promoting this 
effort. The United States will maintain a naval presence in India’s eastern neighbourhood and India 
and the US are cooperating in building an inclusive architecture for cooperation in East and 
Southeast Asia. India’s interaction with the US and Japan is also set to increase in the quest for 
building a stable balance of power across the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. 
As Asia emerges as the hub of international economic growth in the twenty first century, it is the 
longer term Indian aim to see that tensions in the region are subsumed as far as possible, through 
greater economic integration in a common quest for prosperity, as Europe experienced in the 20th 
century. Moreover, there is a measure of confidence that while a rising China will continue to pose a 
strategic challenge, a conflict with China can be avoided not only through bilateral cooperation and 
confidence-building measures (CBM), but also by ensuring a measure of adequacy in India’s defence 
potential. Two mountain divisions are being raised and frontline fighter aircraft deployed on India’s 
borders with China. A substantive development of naval potential is underway, to ensure that the 
Indian navy has two operational aircraft carriers, two nuclear submarines and Scorpene-class 
submarines by the end of this decade. India is also acquiring maritime and airlift capabilities, which 
will enable it to respond appropriately to challenges across its Indian Ocean neighbourhood. 
While there is a measure of optimism about India’s eastern neighbourhood, the country’s Indian 
Ocean neighbourhood, extending from the Afpak region, across the Persian Gulf to the Straits of 
Hormuz and the shores of Somalia, remain volatile. Relations with Pakistan improved substantially, 
with broad agreement reached even on the framework of a settlement to the issue of Jammu and 
Kashmir, during the period 2003-2007, when General Pervez Musharraf was Pakistan’s President. 
This followed an assurance that General Musharraf would not allow “territory under Pakistan’s 
control” to be used for terrorism against India. Relations experienced a setback following the 
terrorist attack on Mumbai in November 2008, which was carried out by members of Lashkar e 
Taiba, an organization based in Pakistan. While dialogue between the two countries has resumed, 
concerns remain that tensions could escalate, should there be another major terrorist attack on 
Indian soil emanating from “territory under Pakistan’s control.” In the meantime, the effort will be 
to see if it is possible to build on the progress achieved before 2007. 
While Pakistan has not formally enunciated a nuclear doctrine, Lt. General Khalid Kidwai, the Head 
of the Strategic Planning Division for its National Command Authority told a team of physicists 
from Italy’s Landau Network in 2002 that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were “aimed solely at India.” 
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According to the report of the Landau team, Kidwai added that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons 
if India conquers a large part of Pakistan’s territory, or destroys a large part of Pakistan’s land and air 
forces. Kidwai also held out the possibility of using nuclear weapons if India tries to “economically 
strangle” Pakistan or pushes it to political destabilization. Most Indian observers acknowledge that 
while there was a tendency within political and diplomatic quarters in Pakistan to wrongly assume 
that India would be deterred from conventional cross border responses if it was made out that 
Pakistan’s nuclear threshold was low, General Kidwai’s elucidation, which came in the wake of 
serious tensions along the borders, was a realistic signal of the military’s views on the thresholds of 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons strategy. They set the stage for preventing misunderstandings about 
nuclear thresholds leading to nuclear escalation. It should, however, be evident that in the event of 
another terrorist attack like that on Mumbai on November 26, 2008, the Indian response is likely to 
be measured, proportionate, carefully calibrated and internationally justifiable. 
India’s nuclear doctrine, first officially enunciated on January 4, 2003, asserts that it intends to build 
and maintain a “credible, minimum deterrent.” This deterrent is to be based on a “triad” of “aircraft, 
mobile land-based missiles, and sea based assets.” While adopting a policy of “no first use,” the 
doctrine clarifies that its nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a major attack on 
Indian territory or against a nuclear attack on Indian forces anywhere. India also retains the right to 
use nuclear weapons in the event of major attacks on Indian territory, or on Indian forces anywhere, 
that use chemical or biological weapons. While concern has been voiced about strained relations 
between India and Pakistan leading to a nuclear conflict, India and Pakistan acknowledged on June 
6, 2004, that “the nuclear capabilities of each other, which are based on their national security 
imperatives, constitute a factor for stability.” Apart from a degree of mutual confidence which now 
exists because of a better understanding of each other’s nuclear thresholds, India and Pakistan have 
cooperated in working out a series of nuclear CBMs. They have signed agreements on “Reducing 
the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons” and “Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of 
Ballistic Missiles.” India’s nuclear arsenal and delivery systems are not “Pakistan specific,” but geared 
to also deal with the existence of substantial Chinese nuclear weapons and delivery capabilities. 
Interestingly, in recent months, there has been the commencement of a Track 2 dialogue between 
India, Pakistan and China, on enhancing nuclear confidence across their borders. 
The US intervention in Afghanistan was ill conceived and failed in military terms from the very 
outset. Actual fighting in the north and the takeover of Kabul was virtually outsourced to the 
Northern Alliance. More inexplicably, no attempt was made to block the exit route of the Taliban 
and Al Qaeda leadership to safe havens in Pakistan, across the Durand Line. This has rejuvenated 
the Taliban and its allies, including the Al Qaeda, inflicting a heavy toll on American lives. With the 
Pakistan army unwilling and unable to crack down on groups long regarded as “assets,” the US and 
its NATO allies are stuck in an apparent quagmire, even though the hope has been expressed that 
Afghan forces will take on counter insurgency responsibilities by the end of 2014. The stalemate in 
Afghanistan is unlikely to end at an early date. It is unlikely that the Taliban will accept a solution 
that requires it to eventually lay down arms and accept the present Afghan Constitution. It is equally 
unlikely that the Taliban will forsake its allies in Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda linked groups like the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the North Caucasus Emirate, Lashkar e Taiba, Harkat ul Jihad ul 
Islami, or Jaish e Mohammed. And ethnic Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks, together with a section of 
Pashtuns in Afghanistan, will resist any attempt at a Taliban takeover. It is unlikely that peace and 
stability will return to Afghanistan, in the course of this decade—a development that will have 
profound implications for peace and stability not just in Pakistan, but regionally and globally. 
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India’s Persian Gulf neighbourhood contains two thirds of the world’s proven petroleum reserves 
and 35% of the world’s gas reserves. Moreover, as energy demands increase worldwide, it is these 
countries, which maintain 90% of the world’s excess production capacity, which alone can meet the 
growing demand of rapidly emerging economies like China and India and help tide over breakdowns 
in supplies elsewhere. India’s major suppliers of oil from the Gulf are Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. An estimated 5.8 million Indians reside and work in member 
states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Indians living in these six Arab States are responsible 
for the bulk of the $50 billion that Indians working abroad remit annually. These six countries meet 
around two-thirds of India’s oil needs. Iran provides 17% of India’s oil imports, with some key 
refineries dependent on Iranian crude. Moreover, Iran remains India’s transit point for trade with 
Central Asia, Afghanistan, and—through the Caspian—Russia. Iran and India share a common 
aversion to the return of Taliban style extremism to Afghanistan, but India joined the US and others 
on issues pertaining to Iran’s nuclear programme. The assessment in the Global Trends 2025 report 
expressing doubt that Iran will inevitably go nuclear is broadly shared in India. But, in dealing with 
Iran, it would be a folly to underestimate the sentiments of of Persian civilizational pride that 
transcend internal political differences. 
The Persian Gulf remains a crucible for ancient rivalries, civilizational (Arab vs. Persian) and 
sectarian (Shia vs. Sunni). The depth of these animosities was exposed when, alluding to King 
Abdullah, Wikileaks revealed the “King’s frequent exhortations to the US to attack Iran and put an 
end to its nuclear weapons programme.” Riyadh even reportedly offered over-flight facilities to 
Israeli warplanes, in the event of an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Israel has astutely played 
on Arab-Persian rivalries to ensure it remains the sole nuclear power in the Middle East. Moreover, 
despite all talk of their solidarity with the Palestinians, a number of Arab countries maintain covert 
and not so covert ties with Mossad. 
The sectarian dimensions of rivalries in the Persian Gulf cannot be ignored. Iran has consistently 
stirred up Shia minorities in Yemen and Kuwait and the Shia majority in Sunni-ruled Bahrain. This 
rivalry is also being played out in Iraq, where the Shia majority has accused its Sunni Arab 
neighbours of backing extremist Sunni groups. Paradoxically, after endeavouring to follow a policy 
of “dual containment” of both Iran and Iraq for over a decade, the US is now finding that its ill 
advised invasion of Iraq has only brought the two countries closer together, with a number of Iraqi 
political and religious figures beholden to Tehran for the support they have received. As Charles 
Freeman, former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, recently observed: "These changes (in the Arab 
world) are occurring as the US withdraws from Iraq, leaving behind a ruined country under heavy 
Iranian influence. Iraq is incapable, at least for now, of resuming its historic role as part of an Arab 
coalition to check Persian aspirations and hegemony in West Asia." While Arab regimes may be 
dependent on American support, the mood in Arab streets is distinctly anti-American—a 
development that will inevitably affect the course of developments in the Middle East and shape the 
contours of global terrorism. 
India’s relations with Arab Gulf States have shown a distinct improvement after the visits of Saudi 
Arabia’s King Abdullah in January 2006 and Dr. Manmohan Singh to Riyadh in February-March 
2010. India has received Saudi assurances of meeting of its growing requirements for oil. The desert 
kingdom and home of Islam’s holiest shrines appears to recognize the need to reach out to countries 
like India and China, even as it maintains its strong security ties with the US. Moreover, relations 
with Oman, the UAE and Qatar have expanded significantly, with Qatar emerging as an important 
supplier of liquified natural gas (LNG). While India enjoyed a good relationship with secular 
Baathist-ruled Iraq, it is the Indian view that the invasion of Iraq was a serious mistake. It has ignited 
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Shia-Sunni rivalries across the oil rich Persian Gulf and led to the emergence of strong links between 
erstwhile foes Iran and Iraq. The entire balance of power in the Persian Gulf has been destabilized. 
The greatest threats to global stability are likely to emerge even beyond the present decade will 
emerge from rivalries, instability, violence and terrorism in the Greater Middle East. It is imperative 
for outside powers to devise common strategies and collective measures to maintain peace and 
stability in this region.  
The Global Trends 2025 Report realistically acknowledges that the US will be one of a number of 
actors on the world stage, albeit the most powerful one. It notes that multipolar systems have been 
more unstable than bipolar or even unipolar ones. While noting that emerging powers and many 
Europeans dispute the right of any one power to be a global hegemon, the report observes this 
could well lead to less cohesiveness. But it is obvious that the new order that emerged with the end 
of the Cold War based on global economic dominance by the Atlantic alliance is no longer 
sustainable. But despite aging populations and the current economic downturn, Europe will remain 
an important player in the development of cutting edge technologies and economic assistance to 
developing countries. China and India are returning to the position they held two centuries ago, 
when they together they produced 45% of the world’s wealth. They are, for the first time since the 
18th Century, set to be the largest contributors to worldwide economic growth. These two countries 
are likely to surpass the GDP of all other countries except the US and perhaps Japan by 2025.  
What now appears to be transpiring is the emergence of a “Multipolar World Order”, where the 
emerging powers have relatively large populations, with their governments increasingly recognizing 
the importance of economic growth and technological advancement as being key to power and 
influence. Wars between emerging powers or with existing economically advanced nations would 
undermine their economic power, erode their global standing, and remain unwinnable. Such wars 
appear unlikely, in an era of increasing economic interdependence. But, rivalries in the quest for 
influence and primacy in different regions of the world and for preferred access to natural resources 
would remain inevitable. It is evident that given its innovative and technological capabilities, its 
technological edge in military capabilities, its vibrant democracy and its openness to immigration, the 
United States is and is likely to remain, the dominant player in world affairs for the foreseeable 
future. But, mired in an economic morass and with rates of economic growth averaging 2-3%, the 
United States cannot exercise influence exclusively. The concerns in the Global Trends 2025 Report 
about a “Fragmented International System,” however, appear misplaced, despite inevitable rivalries 
for influence and access to natural resources. Unlike during the Cold war and in earlier eras, the 
rivalry for natural resources and political influence has necessarily to be moderated by the 
imperatives of global economic interdependence. 
As mentioned earlier, the region stretching from South Asia to East and Southeast Asia is going 
through a historically unprecedented process of economic integration. Rivalries and tensions over 
territorial disputes, access to river water and other resources will, however, remain, along with 
concerns about the future directions of China’s policies. The US has a crucial role to play in 
remaining engaged with this region, in participating in an inclusive architecture for cooperation and 
security and for securing a viable Asian balance of power. The recently expanded East Asia Summit 
which brings together the members of ASEAN with Japan, South Korea, China, Australia, New 
Zealand, India, Russia, and the US, provides an inclusive and viable framework for seeking these 
objectives. These developments are taking place at a time when emerging powers are building 
groupings like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, where they can ensure that their 
interests on issues like energy, global warming, world trade and international finance are protected. 
Emerging countries will also seek to evolve a common approach to respond to efforts for “regime 
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change” through the use of military force, under the rubric of “Responsibility to Protect.” The 
emergence of the G20 as a forum to discuss global economic issues also reflects these changes in 
global power equations. 
The Tomorrow’s Security Challenges report alludes to the rise of non-state networks and possibilities of a 
return of Great Power confrontations. Given the volatility of the political situation across the greater 
Middle East, it is evident that the problems posed by local, regional and global terrorist networks 
will continue. As global communications and interconnectivity expand, networking between terrorist 
organizations will inevitably expand, posing a greater threat to global stability. The US and more 
significantly its European allies will remain vulnerable to such threats, given the growing population 
of immigrants and expatriate populations who bring local grievances and prejudices from their home 
countries. Manifestations of what some describe as “Islamophobia” in countries like France may, 
however, only increase the potential for terrorist violence across Europe. 
Despite its military/technological edge, the United States will find it costly and difficult to respond 
to perceived threats through conventional military intervention, as it has done in the past decade in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan cost the American taxpayer an estimated 
total of $1.1 trillion through July 2010. The Iraq invasion led to an estimated 655,000 Iraqis killed 
and 4.2 million displaced from their homes. It has only resulted in greater instability across the 
greater Middle East, with sectarian rivalries being accentuated and the entire balance of power 
destabilised. While the military intervention in Afghanistan was inevitable and internationally 
justifiable after the terrorist strikes of 9/11, the wisdom and necessity of military action in Iraq is 
questionable. Both these conflicts have established that counterinsurgency on foreign soil is 
expensive and often unwinnable. The AK-47, IED, and suicide bomber are great “equalizers.” They 
can render counter-insurgency operations in distant lands costly and unsustainable.  
In these circumstances, it is important that, while avoiding massive commitments of ground forces, 
powers like the US deploy their military potential and particularly ground forces rarely, using them 
selectively and primarily as a deterrent. Ill advised and ill planned use of military power, which 
cannot achieve strategic objectives in a matter of days, only reduces credibility and invites challenges. 
Moreover, use of force has to invariably enjoy international sanction and legitimacy. As global 
economic interdependence grows, ways will be found for major powers not to allow competition to 
lead to confrontation. The global situation is such that no major power can prevail militarily over 
real or perceived rivals, without having to pay unacceptably high costs, nationally. The challenge lies 
in devising frameworks of consultation and cooperation, to avoid competition spiralling into 
confrontation. 
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